This paper derives new results on the effects of employing Taylor rules in economies that are subject to real market imperfections such as production externalities. Policies which respond to output movements can block sunspot equilibria that arise from the increasing returns. The paper also finds that rules which should be chosen (avoided) in perfect market environments often yield (ensure) multiple (unique) rational expectations solutions in alternative settings. Therefore, exact knowledge on the degree of market imperfection may be integral for robust policy advice.
The Taylor rule (1993) provides a good description of how many central banks attempt to set interest rates in order to achieve stable prices while avoiding large fluctuations in output and employment. There is evidence, however, that Taylor rules can be a source of economic instability in and of themselves. For example, Benhabib, Schmidt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001) demonstrate that steering under this policy may in fact introduce real indeterminacy in an otherwise determinate economy. As a consequence, proponents of the Taylor rule frequently advise the monetary authority to assign aggressive backward-looking principles in which interest rates respond to predetermined variables, in particular to inflation (see for example Fuerst, 1999, Benhabib, Schmidt-Grohé, and Uribe 2003) .
The present paper qualifies this advise by suggesting that before spelling out concrete policy guidelines, the monetary authority should first be au courant with the specific economic environment. Fuerst (2000, 2001) have demonstrated how monetary policy should depend on the timing convention in monetary models. The present paper adds another dimension to the discussion: the real side of the economy. In particular, it demonstrates that the presence of mild forms of market imperfections-modeled as arising from production externalities-may have fundamental consequences on how monetary policy should be conducted.
The motivation for the current research stems from the insights of recently formulated non-monetary dynamic general equilibrium models with sunspot equilibria and self-fulfilling prophecies.
1 In these models the possibility of a continuum of equilibria is the consequence of empirically plausible market imperfections-therefore, sunspot equilibria are more than a theoretical curiosity. The present paper combines the two branches of the indeterminacy literature by money-augmenting these real models in order to examine the effects of monetary policy on indeterminacy as well as to assess monetary policy recommendations in suboptimal economies. The framework I will draw upon is Wen (1998) which is currently the most successful attempt in terms of obtaining sunspot equilibria at small increasing returns and in generating realistic business cycles (see also Benhabib and Wen 2004) .
Main Results. The main findings of the paper can be stated as follows. In the presence of market imperfections, output-targeting in the imperfect markets model does increase the determinacy space. That is, determinacy generally arises for a given, indeterminate inflation-targeting when output-targeting is introduced. By responding sufficiently to output movements in setting the nominal interest rate, the monetary authority can stabilize sunspot-driven economies. The reasoning is thatin a cash-in-advance environment-the nominal interest rate operates like an inflation tax on holding money. Now, suppose, for example, that buoyant expectations (about future output or wealth) seep through the economy. Economic activity rises simply because everybody believes so. Given some degree of increasing returns these expectations may be self-fulfilling. However, when monetary policy is set as such to increase the nominal interest rate in response to the output fluctuations, the sunspot blips can be dimmed: policy has real effects because real consumption and labor demand become more costly. Consequently, the higher nominal interest rates build up the costs of the economic expansion and therefore of the optimistic expectations; the optimistic expectations will no longer be sustainable in the first place. Phrased alternatively, the inflation tax-distortions operate by precluding the effects of high increasing returns to scale and non-fundamental equilibria can be removed.
I also find that Taylor rules work quite differently depending on the fundamentals of the economy. In fact, it appears to be the case that strategies which should be chosen (avoided) in perfect markets environments do in fact yield multiple (unique) rational expectations solutions in alternative settings. For example, backward-looking policy settings that ensure unique rational expectations in cases of constant returns to scale (aggressive with respect to inflation and somewhat passive with respect to output) are connected to indeterminacy at moderate imperfections and vice versa. On the other hand, current-looking rules which always create indeterminacy under constant returns are a vehicle to remove technology-based sunspot equilibria. Consequently, the central bank should have a clear picture of market imperfections before setting policy rules. Unfortunately, existing empirical studies do not provide an unambiguous answer regarding the extent of the imperfections.
Related Work. The argument which is developed in the current paper is framed within a fully specified cash-in-advance environment which has been shown by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) to have fundamentally different policy implications than New-IS-LM or versions of money-in-utility frameworks. My study differs from theirs in three key aspects, however. First, their production technology is constant returns to scale. By contrast, I allow empirically plausible production externalities which lead to increasing returns. Second, in their model the central bank's nominal interest rate targets inflation only. The current paper considers versions of the original Taylor rule in which the interest rate is increased or decreased according to what is happening to both real GDP and to inflation-as it turns out, outputtargeting becomes essential in eliminating sunspot equilibria in imperfect economies. Furthermore, I present new results on interest smoothing.
The work here also shares similarities with Christiano (2000) . Christiano introduces money into the Christiano and Harrison (1999) model which assumes increasing returns to scale equal to the inverse of the capital share. As a consequence, his model has two stationary states. The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate proportional to the contemporaneous employment level and is thereby able to eliminate endogenous sunspot cycles in the neighborhood of one of the steady states. In a sense, the economic mechanisms in Christiano's paper and mine parallel. However, several important differences distinguish his work from mine. First, the present paper does not rest on scale economies that fault on empirical findings. Second, my economy does not move between two steady states. Third, as a consequence the choice and the optimal set of policies differ. More concretely, the monetary rule which is proposed near the high-level steady state by Christiano does not generally deliver determinacy at modest increasing returns. My findings put a much more stringent cap on policy. Specifically, when assuming a current-looking rule as in Christiano, a mix of inflation-and output-targeting is needed to eliminate endogenous cycles. Lastly, the current work experiments with more general versions of the Taylor rule (i.e. backward-and forward-looking and interest rate smoothing).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model economy. Section 2 discusses the connection of monetary policy, market imperfections, and sunspot equilibria. Section 3 addresses interest rate smoothing. Section 4 concludes.
THE ECONOMY
The physical setup of the economy's real part is a standard real business cycle model augmented by production complementarities. Currency is introduced by imposing restrictions on the timing of exchanges.
Preferences and Technologies
The representative household seeks at time t ϭ 0 to maximize
where β, c t and l t are the discount factor, consumption, and labor during t. The household rents labor and capital services to firms. All markets are perfectly competitive. The household's budget constraint can be stated as
where P t is the price level, M t are the cash balances at the beginning of t, w t is the real wage, and r t is the real rental rate of capital, k t . The variable u t denotes the degree of capital utilization. The depreciation rate of installed capital, δ t , is increasing in utilization
N t stands for one-period bank deposits which pay a short-term nominal interest given by R t . Π t is the profit flow from firms and intermediaries. A positive value is assigned to the inconvertible currency by assuming that during the shopping session the household is subject to the cash-in-advance-restriction M t ϩ P t w t l t ≥ P t c t ϩ N t that is, households circulate all their money (plus wage payments) to firms by consumption purchases and loans to the financial intermediaries. Output is produced by a large number of competitive firms with identical technologies. The economy as a whole is affected by organizational synergies that cause the output of an individual firm to be higher if all other firms in the economy are producing more. The term A t stands for these aggregate externalities. The production complementarities are taken as given for the individual optimizer and they cannot be priced or traded. Departures from constant returns to scale are measured by γ Ͼ 1. 3 A firm of type i has technology
Here, k t (l t ) denotes-by way of normalization-the economy-wide average capital (labor) input. Before hiring workers, firms must borrow cash at the short-term rate from the financial intermediaries. This is necessary because they start the period 2. A previous version of this paper discussed a model with money-in-utility and very similar insights arose.
3. See Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and others for an alternative (and in reduced-form equivalent) formulation that incorporates internal increasing returns at the intermediate-firm level in an imperfectly competitive market structure without free entry. In that case, the externality parameter would (also) relate to the monopoly markup.
without money balances to finance their wage bills. This is the second source of money demand.
Intermediaries, the Central Bank, and Government
The monetary branch of the economy comes in two parts: the intermediary sector and the central bank. The perfectly competitive intermediaries have two sources of cash. They receive deposits from the households which are repaid at the gross rate of interest. Intermediaries also receive new cash injections, M 
Firms' loans must be paid back at the end of the period in order for the financial intermediaries to repay the households.
Most central banks implement monetary policy by controlling a short-term nominal interest rate. Accordingly, it has become standard to represent monetary policy in terms of commitment to a rule for the nominal rate of interest. In the present paper, the monetary authority sets the short-run nominal interest rate based on what is happening to both real GDP and inflation. For example, a backward-looking rule is given by
in which the variables appear as percentage deviations from their stationary states R, π and y. We denote rules with τ Ͻ 1 (τ Ͼ 1) as passive (aggressive) since the nominal interest rate moves less (more) than one-for-one with past inflation. The term ω refers to the respective weight given to deviations of real GDP from the target level. Since the general equilibrium setting imposes a money demand relationship (i.e. the cash-in-advance setup), the interest rate rule implies that the money supply is endogenous. Fiscal policy is passive in Leeper's (1991) sense.
Dynamics and Calibration
In what follows, I restrict the analysis to a symmetric equilibrium in which u i,t ϭ u t , k i,t ϭ k t , and l i,t ϭ l t . The aggregate production technology becomes
which exhibits returns to scale equal to γ. The economy's dynamics are given by
Equation (2) describes the leisure-consumption trade-off and Equation (3) pins down the optimal utilization rate of capital. Equations (4) and (5) are the usual Fisher and Euler conditions. Equation (6) repeats the intertemporal constraint.
Since no closed-form solution exists, the model must be approximated. For example, in log-linearized form, the dynamics of the model with a backward-looking rule reduce to
The dynamical system contains two non-predetermined (or jump) variables: ĉ tϩ1 and R tϩ2 . Determinacy requires that exactly two eigenvalues of the 4 × 4-matrix M are outside the unit circle. On the other hand, indeterminacy arises in situations in which one root at most has modulus greater than one. If, for example, exactly three eigenvalues have modulus less than one, then multiple rational expectations solutions such as the following exist:
Here ζ tϩ1 is an arbitrary random variable with E t ζ tϩ1 ϭ 0. I will now assign parameter values and demonstrate the empirical plausibility of sunspot equilibria. The time unit is taken to be a quarter of a year. The calibration is based on empirical observations on post-war U.S. data. The capital share, α, is set equal to 30%, the discount factor, β, is chosen to be 0.99, and the steady state rate of capital depreciation, δ, is 2.5%. The elasticity θ can then be derived from steady state conditions:
This value falls into the vicinity of the GMM-estimate reported by Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1996) .
When separating the real side of the economy, the calibration implies a minimum degree of externalities, γ min, needed for indeterminacy that amount to 1.103681742. The value is reasonable given empirical findings. For example, Caballero and Lyons (1992) obtain increasing increasing-returns estimates in the order of 1.26-1.56. Baxter and King (1991) find returns to scale of 1.53, however, combined with a standard error of 0.56. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1995) report a point estimate of 0.98. Again their standard error of 0.34 is large. Basu and Fernald (1997) also find close to constant returns, however, the imparted estimation-uncertainty is significant again. Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) suggest point estimates ranging from 1.09 to 1.11.
The reasoning for multiplicity in the real economy is as follows. Equations (1) and (3) entail the reduced form-output
Thus, the effective labor-output elasticity is larger than unity for
Accordingly, the reduced-form labor demand curve is upward sloping at mild increasing returns.
5 How do sunspot equilibria come about? Suppose people suddenly have pessimistic expectations and expect lower future income. The permanent income motive will reduce today's consumption. The static-first order condition (2) implies that the labor supply schedule moves outwards. Given the upwardsloping equilibrium labor demand curve, employment and investment will actually both fall today. As a consequence, the future capital stock, output, and consumption will all be low and the initially pessimistic expectations will be self-fulfilled. The sunspot circle is completed.
The determinacy properties of the model do not change when money is introduced and the central bank pegs the nominal rate (τ → 0 and ω → 0). The specific interest 4. If the depreciation costs are high (θ → ∞) and accordingly capital utilization is set constant by agents, the condition reduces to that found in Harrison and Weder (2002) ; the minimum increasing returns fall outside of the plausible region. However, the condition also implies an upward-sloping labor demand curve and all of the below qualitative results can be replicated in such an environment.
5. Upward-sloping labor demand arises for γ ≥ γ min ≥ γ up ϭ 1.094488115. The reason for the gap between γ min and γ up and the gap's positive dependence on the time period's length comes from discounting future benefits (costs) at the relevant intertemporal margins. When formulating the model in continuous time, the two thresholds are identical-the same sort of gap arises in the original Farmer and Guo (1994) model (see Salyer 1995) . rate policy causes the economy to behave identically to the model that only includes the real sector.
HOW SHOULD MONETARY POLICY BE CONDUCTED?
This section discusses the effects of various versions of the Taylor rule on the qualitative dynamics of the artificial economy. It opens by assuming that the central bank sets nominal interest rates after having observed (past) inflation and output (Section 2.1). This is followed by discussions of forward-looking and current-looking rules (Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
Indeterminacy Zones with Backward-looking Rules
This subsection will examine various versions of backward-looking Taylor rules in economies with constant and increasing returns to scale. I will start combing for parametric indeterminacy zones by considering a constant returns to scale technology (γ ϭ 1) which will help in understanding the increasing-returns cases.
Constant returns to scale. When I set (ω ϭ 0), the four eigenvalues of M are
The eigenvalues are the same as those reported in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) despite the absence of variable capital utilization and variable capital depreciation in their model. The third eigenvalue exposes the policy's direct impact on dynamics: policy-induced indeterminacy can be avoided simply by responding aggressively to past inflation, whereas passive responses lead to multiplicity. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) do not consider the effects of output-targeting on the economy's dynamics. This will be done here next as a further step toward an understanding of Taylor rules in suboptimal equilibria. Let us suppose that the central bank reacts in part to past movements in output, ω Ͼ 0.
6 Figure 1 summarizes numerical solutions. The central bank must simultaneously select both policy parameters since indeterminacy may arise for a given, determinate inflation-targeting when output-targeting is introduced. The dashed line in the figure suggests that the dynamical structure stays broadly unaffected when very small increasing returns are introduced. Moreover, by letting τ ϭ 1.5, as in Taylor's original formulation, the bank's output-coupled response must be ω Ͻ 0.5 or policy-induced cycles will crop up. In sum, policy should be a combination of active inflation-targeting and the response to output should not be too strong otherwise sunspot cycles arise.
Indeterminacy from output-targeting arises as follows. Suppose that current inflation increases. Future nominal interest rates will rise which will increase today's consumption. Therefore, the labor supply curve shifts inward which, since the capital 6. Dynamics can be derived analytically within special cases only (see Appendix). stock is given, lowers current output. Accordingly, the future interest rate will rise by less than under the pure inflation-peg:
As a consequence, stationary sunspot sequences-not involving unsustainable inflation patterns-become more likely when the central bank targets output. These sunspot sequences are only possible when the ω-weights fall into a certain range: only relatively small values of ω-in combination with aggressive inflationtargeting-bring forth determinacy.
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Increasing returns to scale. Next, I will turn to cases in which the economy is imperfect and subject to real indeterminacy stemming from production externalities. That is, I will discuss how the determinacy properties of the Wen (1998) model change when a monetary policy rule is introduced. The question I ask is: can the central bank stamp out externality-generated sunspot equilibria by choosing an appropriate Taylor-design? When the central bank reacts to inflationary movements only, indeterminacy arising from mild production externalities cannot be eliminated. This can easily be seen by numerically checking for the minimum increasing returns for alternative τ values (other parameters are as in Table 1 ). These returns to scale are 1 at τ → 0, they jump to 1.103708061 at τ ϭ 1 and are 1.103734395 at τ ϭ 1000000.
I therefore shift attention to cases involving output-targeting.
7. For very large ω-values, the output-related movements will be too strong to preserve stationarity and sunspots can be ruled out again. Numerically, ω must be larger than 30 which is implausibly high (not reported in Figure 1 ). Generally, once non-convexities in the production function are present, analytical versions of the eigenvalues become highly non-linear and offer only limited insights. Thus, I will employ numerical solutions.
8 Let us step up γ to 1.11 so that production complementarities induce sunspot equilibria in environments without money (the other parameters are as in Table 1 ). The specific value draws on Benhabib and Wen (2004) who propose it by observing that the model's cycle frequency matches that of U.S. output. Furthermore, the magnitude of scale economies is at the low end of what is needed to generate indeterminacy and it falls into the scope of the studies mentioned in Section 1.3. Figure 2 pins down the policy advice under the assumption of γ ϭ 1.11. The only way for the central bank to tackle endogenous cycles that arise from the production externalities is by working against output movements: if it does not (ω ϭ 0), indeterminacy always occurs. The figure also shows that for any given τ, the output-related response must be sufficiently large to obtain unique solutions: even when ω takes on strictly positive values, the specific choice of inflation-targeting may imply any of the three possible regimes (indeterminacy, determinacy, or source-the latter Fig. 2 . Inflation-and Output-Targeting under Increasing Returns to Scale (γ ϭ 1.11); Backward-Looking Rules. By increasing γ, the U-shaped curve moves up-it disappears for γ Ͻ γ min . To the right of the dashed line, the constant returns to scale model has a unique equilibrium.
8. Analytical solutions can be found in the Appendix. region may imply endogenous cycles on its own). In agreement with the above analytical experiment, monetary policies that are very offensive with respect to output fluctuations (or even ω → ∞) are generally a good insurance against indeterminacy: output-targeting increases the determinacy space. Lastly, the dashed line in Figure 2 repeats the border between determinacy and indeterminacy for the noexternalities case: there exists a small region for which determinacy is possible at both constant and increasing returns. Figure 3 shows that an economy with constant capital utilization displays the same sort of problem for the central bank. The model is identical to Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994) augmented by the same monetary superstructure which was outlined in Section 1. In this model, I have set the returns to scale at 1.5. This is admittedly an empirically unrealistic value, however, it is needed to generate indeterminacy. The other parameters are set as in Table 1 . Under constant returns to scale the dynamical properties of the models with and without variable capital utilization are identical as can be seen from the dashed line. Once again, outputtargeting is key to pre-emptying sunspot equilibria under increasing returns. There is a small parametric region in which determinacy arises with and without scale economies. Overall, the (qualitative) results parallel those of the non-constant utilization model-the general policy implications are not restricted to Section 1's model.
The result that output-targeting eliminates sunspot equilibria is reminiscent of Guo and Lansing (1998) and Christiano and Harrison (1999) who find that progressive tax systems effectively eliminate indeterminacy by taxing away increasing returns in real economies. The Taylor policy suggested here generates a similar distortionary effect. The economic reasoning is easy to see: if ω is sufficiently large, then output fluctuations (i.e. production bunching) that arise from believing in them simply become too costly. Let us walk through a sunspot sequence that is blocked by the central bank for further understanding of the result. Suppose that people embellish optimistic expectations without any fundamental cause. By projecting high future income, they will ratchet up today's consumption expenditures. The high increasing returns will increase today's employment and output as a result of the upwardsloping equilibrium labor demand curve. Now, if the output response of the central bank is strong enough, then R tϩ1 will increase and the initially sanguine expectations will be preempted (i) by increasing the costs of hiring labor (Equation 2) and (ii) by reducing t ϩ 1 consumption demand (Equation 4) which will lower t ϩ 1 employment and therefore lower output. The initially optimistic expectations are not fulfilled and the sunspot cycle is broken.
To conclude, the analysis of backward-looking rules suggests that central banks should be careful about the specific economic environment when setting policy rules. I find that the backward-looking inflation-targeting rule advocated by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) no longer guarantees uniqueness. It is imperative for the interest rate to intercept output fluctuations. To offer a concrete example, my numerical analysis suggests that Taylor's (1993) original principle (τ ϭ 1.5 and ω ϭ 0.5) constitutes a successful code of stabilizing sunspot fluctuations at γ ϭ 1.11. However, Figure 1 also shows that if increasing returns are slightly smaller-say, at γ ϭ 1.05-then the economy skids into a sunspots regime. 
Indeterminacy Zones with Forward-looking Rules
It may be suspected that the result is dependent on assuming a backward-looking policy rule. Yet, the general picture that Taylor rule settings should consider technology does not change when the central bank formulates its policy using expected values such as in
With forward-looking rules, the model boils down to
which involves the two jump variables ĉ tϩ1 and R tϩ1 . Constant returns to scale. Beginning with the case of inflation-targeting and noexternalities (ω ϭ 0 and γ ϭ 1), the three eigenvalues of J are 
This reverses the result obtained under backward-looking rules: all active policy responses (i.e. τ Ͼ 1) are precluded so it is necessary for policy to be passive in Taylor's sense.
Let us turn to cases involving output-targeting. Numerical solutions similar to those as displayed in Figure 1 show that the zones are simply swapped with those that arise under backward-looking policies. 9 Monetary policy should not be too aggressive. The economic reasoning for this indeterminacy is analogous to that of backwardlooking policy except that sunspot-driven increases in consumption now lower the nominal rate given active responses to future inflation. This will decrease labor supply and therefore output. Current investment falls and next period's capital stock will be smaller. Thus, it is likely that future output is lower as well-there will be downward pressure on the current nominal rate and the sunspot cycle is established.
Increasing returns to scale. Let us now walk through the increasing returns to scale scenario. Suppose that production externalities are γ ϭ 1.11. Figure 4 plots determinacy regions in the τ-ω-space. Uniqueness requires a tough policy with respect to inflation which must be backed up by (relatively mild) responses to output. Moreover, the constant returns proposal (τ Ͻ 1) always creates sunspot equilibria, thus, the policy advice is different across technological regimes. For example, 9. In the model, fiscal policy is passive in Leeper's (1991) sense. Therefore, it is possible for combinations of passive monetary and passive fiscal policies to lead to determinacy. if the central bank sets τ ϭ 1.5, then sunspot cycles are ostracized for weak outputtargeting 0.12 Ͻ ω Ͻ 0.42. However, at slightly smaller externalities at which indeterminacy does not arise from technology, say at γ ϭ 1.10, that very policy creates indeterminacy.
In sum, simply applying very aggressive inflation-targeting does not bring about determinacy. This is the antithesis of the backward-looking policy's proposal. The economics behind the result are parallel to those in Section 2.1: interest rate policy can be used to counter the benefits of production bunching and it is therefore capable of automatically stabilizing the economy. 
Indeterminacy with Current-looking Rules
Let us next consider current-looking rules of the form
The dynamics of the complete model are given by
Constant returns to scale. There is always indeterminacy even when output is targeted by the central bank. This can be seen by inspecting the eigenvalues of W:
The first two eigenvalues are always inside the unit circle. In fact, they do not even contain the parameters τ or ω. Therefore, the upshot appears to be a clear case against using current-looking rules either with or without output-targeting.
Increasing returns. This scenario changes, however, when γ Ͼ γ min . Figure 5 plots determinacy regions while setting γ ϭ 1.11. Now there exists an area in which applying a current-looking Taylor rule can eliminate sunspot equilibria. In a nutshell, the central bank must react sufficiently to output and (to a lesser extent) to inflation.
Current-looking rules may therefore be a channel that eliminates sunspot fluctuations that arise from scale economies. In a sense, the result parallels Christiano (2000) . Near his economy's high-level steady state, a policy that sets the nominal interest rate proportional to current employment can stabilize the economy. Here, in an economy with a more realistic departure from constant returns to scale, a much more stringent requirement is placed on policy. In fact, output-targeting must sufficiently lean-against-the-wind and always be supported by inflation-targeting. 
Proposition 3: (Current-looking rules) Current-looking rules always imply indeterminacy at constant returns to scale. Indeterminacy arising from mild externalities can be eliminated by aggressive output-targeting (in combination with inflationtargeting).
To conclude, Section 2 has shown that various formulations of the Taylor rule generate very different economic dynamics depending on the economic environment. In particular, the presence of market imperfections (i.e. production externalities or monopolistic competition) fundamentally changes the policy recommendations that apply when these market imperfections are not present. This implies that pinning down the empirical degree of imperfections in actual economies may turn out to be an integral part of designing monetary policy. Table 2 summarizes the findings (n.a. denotes no policy with determinacy available).
NOMINAL INTEREST RATE SMOOTHING
Empirical studies on the Taylor rule generally include the lagged interest rate. In what follows, I will explore determinacy properties of interest rate smoothing in a Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999 , Giannoni and Woodford, 2002 , Benhabib, Schmidt-Grohé, and Uribe, 2003 .
Nominal Interest Rate Smoothing and Forward-looking Inflation-targeting
Let us first consider hybrid Taylor-type rules such as
in which the parameter ρ stands for interest rate smoothing (the formulation applies Clarida, Galí, and Gertler's, 1998 , baseline case which they estimate for several central banks). Generally, estimates of Equation (10) find a high degree of inertia and slightly greater than one-for-one increases in the nominal rate in response to inflation. Furthermore, the response to the output gap is mostly found to be small for the U.S. post-1980 period. Therefore, let us assume ω ϭ 0. Under constant returns to scale, the following four eigenvalues depict the dynamics
(the dynamical system involves two jump variables). The first two eigenvalues split around the unit circle. If ρ ϭ 0, the third eigenvalue is zero and the policy should be passive; of course, the argument simply repeats the finding for forward-looking rules (see Section 2.2.1). By making ρ positive, the last two eigenvalues become complex at ρ′ ϭ 1 4τ
and cross the unit circle at ρ″ ϭ 1 Ϫ τ .
We see from the ρ″-condition, that depending purely on a passive rule no longer guarantees determinacy since, ceteris paribus, large values of ρ push the economy out of the determinacy region. Empirical evidence points to central bank policies such as ρ ≈ 0.85 and τ ≈ 1.1-under the assumption of no or very small externalities, the analysis suggests that banks should avoid these policies to not create endogenous fluctuations. I will now turn to market imperfections. Figure 6 shows the determinacy regions for (i) constant returns to scale and (ii) mild increasing returns, γ ϭ 1.11. The two areas do not overlap which underlines the central bank's dilemma. Taylor rule prescriptions concerning the smoothing parameter differ across technological regimes: under constant returns the policy's response should be passive, whereas strong interest rate smoothing will eliminate sunspot equilibria when increasing returns to scale are operating. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Giannoni and Woodford (2002) have suggested that backward-looking Taylor rules' performances can be improved by adding lagged values of the nominal interest rate. In particular, they consider the rule R tϩ1 ϭ ρR t ϩ τπ t and find that a smoothing coefficient greater than one guarantees unique equilibria. Let us again begin by assuming constant returns to scale and endogenous capital accumulation (the above-mentioned papers by Giannoni, Rotemberg, and Woodford abstract from capital). The dynamics are characterized by the four eigenvalues
Nominal Interest Rate Smoothing and Backward-looking Inflation-targeting
The parameters τ and ρ enter in complementary fashion and determinacy simply requires that τ ϩ ρ Ͼ 1 (the underlying dynamical system has two jump variables). Thus, ρ Ͼ 1 is indeed a sufficient condition for ruling out indeterminacy and the result carries over to the current perfectly flexible price, cash-in-advance model.
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However, the advice given is no longer valid once market imperfections are present. My numerical analysis suggests that there are no τ-ρ-constellations that deliver determinacy at γ ϭ 1.11. For example, with τ ϭ ρ ϭ 1, the four eigenvalues are {0,0.8534 ± 0.2941i,2.0338} .
Once again, the presence of market imperfections has nontrivial effects on the design of monetary policy. By pushing up the smoothing parameter ρ, the elimination of indeterminacy is no longer guaranteed. Accordingly, output-targeting is required to preempt the sunspot equilibria. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Recent literature on Taylor rules has suggested that the monetary authority should adopt aggressive, backward-looking rules. For example, Fuerst (2000, 2003) advise that [t] o avoid doing harm, the central bank should place most weight on past movements in the inflation rate. [Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2000, p. 22] The present paper has shown that we must be very cautious with any generalized proposals. There are many dimensions, for example, modeling assumptions on the monetary side Fuerst, 2000, 2001 ) and on the real side of the economy (the current paper) that may impact monetary policy's effects. These must be considered before spelling out a specific policy.
To demonstrate this, I add a cash-in-advance superstructure to an otherwise fully specified dynamic general equilibrium model that generates indeterminacy by externalities. Once increasing returns are present, most of the policy proposals contained in the existing literature-such as the ones prescribed by Carlstrom and Fuerst-are overturned. For example, when formulating the Taylor policy on past observations, inflation-targeting will not eliminate sunspot equilibria and aggressive output-targeting is required. Furthermore, rules which should be avoided (chosen) in perfect market environments often ensure (yield) unique (multiple) rational expectations solutions in alternative settings (Table 3) .
Thus, my analysis points out that under increasing returns, policies that target output increase the determinacy space. This result shares the flavor of the recent policy Contrary to the results in [flexible price models], determinacy now depends upon the output response coefficient φ x , and not solely upon the inflation-coefficient φ π ; and indeed, a large enough positive coefficient suffices to guarantee determinacy. [Woodford, 2003, p. 254f.] Since the current policy debate is predominantly driven by the New-Keynesians, let me briefly comment on three exemplary similarities and differences to the increasing-returns model.
11 Firstly, Woodford's above comments concern currentlooking rules. In line with Woodford, I find this conduct of monetary policy desirable in the presence of modest market imperfections-otherwise it generates economic instability. However, in the increasing-returns model, the output-coefficient must be larger than one which decreases the determinacy space relative to the stickyprice Neo-Wicksellian model.
Secondly, Woodford (2003, p. 258) reports that an inflation-coefficient larger than one (and less than 27) is sufficient for determinacy when the Taylor rule is set forward-looking. Similarly, in the increasing-returns model sunspot equilibria are preemptied if the inflation-coefficient exceeds one, however, it is necessary here to simultaneously target output movements.
Thirdly, Giannoni and Woodford (2002) and Woodford (2003) report that active interest smoothing pushes the economy into the determinacy region like (unlike) the increasing (constant) returns case here. However, I find that forceful smoothing is not sufficient since large inflation-coefficients generate instability. Once again, the determinacy space appears to be more restricted in the present model. This being said, there certainly are parallels between the Neo-Wicksellian model and flexible price models with market imperfections. In some sense, this supports the connections that Farmer (2000) has laid out between real indeterminacy models and models that display price rigidities.
12 However, the specific policy proposals differ in detail; policy recommendations are more delicate than the New Keynesian literature suggests.
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To summarize, when designing monetary policy in practice, essential information must be inferred from empirical estimates of market imperfections. Unfortunately, the existing work on this issue does not offer a clear cut answer-the measurement of the degree of increasing returns is simply too imprecise-which, given my results poses a dilemma for the central bank.
11. Of course, there is no single New Keynesian model. For example, Kiley (2003) finds determinacy constellations that are diamentral to Woodford's model which I nevertheless use as the benchmark here.
12. Another parallel is that the original Taylor principle for backward-looking rules-τ ϭ 1.5 and ω ϭ 0.5-results in determinacy (indeterminacy) in increasing (constant) returns to scale economies (see Section 2.1.2).
13. Of course, a hybrid model which incorporates both increasing returns and sticky prices would be the benchmark from which to judge these issues further. This is planned in future work. Indeterminacy arises for parameter constellations that satisfy ω Ϫ 1 Ͻ τ Ͻ 1 ϩ ω .
The right-hand-side inequality implies that active inflation-fighting policies eliminate sunspot equilibria. More generally, the central bank must simultaneously select both policy parameters because an intermediate range of τ values that generates indeterminacy for given ω exists. There is a discontinuity at τ ϭ ω ϭ 0 at which the model undergoes real determinacy but nominal indeterminacy.
14 By employing the special case δ → 1 as in McCallum (1989) , the basic insights for backward-looking policies can be derived from tractable analytical expressions even when capital is endogenous. The four eigenvalues of M are and the economy would drift into the indeterminacy zone by decreasing τ. It is easy to see that by increasing ω, the third eigenvalue
